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PERIODICALS.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vol. III. Nos. 2 and 3.

UEBER DIE EMPFINDLICHKEIT DES GRÜNBLINDEN UND DES NORMALEN AUGES
GEGEN FARBENÄNDERUNG IM SPEKTRUM. By *E. Brodhum*.

KÜRZESTE LINIEN IM FARBENSYSTEM. By *H. v. Helmholtz*.

DIE RAUMANSCHAUUNGEN UND DIE AUGENBEWEGUNGEN. By *Th. Lipps*.

EINE BEOBSACHTUNG ÜBER DAS INDIREKTE SEHEN. By *Th. Wertheim*.

UEBER EINIGE EIGENTÜMLICHKEITEN DES TASTSINNS. By *G. Sergi*.

BEITRÄGE ZUR VERGLEICHENDEN PSYCHOLOGIE. I. Das Verhalten wirbelloser
Tiere auf der Drehscheibe. By *A. L. Schaefer*.

GEGENANTWORT AUF DIE ERWIDERUNG VON O. FLÜGEL. By *J. Rehmke*.

LITTERATURBERICHT.

The value of the first article on the sensitiveness of the green-blind and the normal eye in perceiving color-variations in the spectrum consists mainly in the three diagrams that exhibit the results obtained in the author's experiments.

Professor H. v. Helmholtz published in a former number his attempt at propounding "a formula which should play the same part in the province of color-sensations as the formula of the length of the linear element plays in geometry." . . . As geometry begins with the concept of a shortest line between two points, so our fundamental formula in this subject shall enable us to find that series of transitions between two given colors for which the sum of the perceptible differences is a minimum. Helmholtz proposes to call them "shortest color-lines" and comes to the conclusion that the whole domain of these apparently irregular phenomena are easily subsumed under a generalised formulation of Fechner's law.

Professor Th. Lipps criticises Wundt with regard to the latter's theory of measuring the visual field by ocular motion. Wundt's theory, he declares, is in need of several auxiliary hypotheses, such as the assumption that certain ocular motions are supposed to be more difficult than others: the visual field is said to possess the form of a spherical surface, etc. The author maintains that ocular motions do contribute to the construction of our space-conception, but in a different way than Wundt assumes. The most interesting part of the article appears to be the discussion of the genesis of the third dimension which is not given in the data of sensation but added to them as a judgment concerning these data. It is an interpretation of the data. There are still psychologists who regard the third dimension as immediately given. Professor Lipps refers as an instance to Prof. William

James's article "The Perception of Space" in (*Mind*, Vol. XII), where the latter declares that "no arguments in the world can prove a feeling which actually exists, to be impossible." While Wundt says that to the resting eye the form of the visual field is spherical because the sky appears to us as spherical; Lipps declares that we might just as well say that the visual field of the resting eye is a plane, because the earth appears to us as a level surface. We attribute to the visual field the form which certain reasons prompt us to. Certain convergences of the eyes induce us to place certain points at certain distances. We read, as it were, the distances out of the convergences of the ocular axes. Accordingly, when we cease to feel any difference in our feeling of convergency we cannot help attributing the same "depth" throughout to all the things with respect to which such feeling is wanting, and we place all objects beyond a certain range upon a spherical surface. Thus Lipps interprets the spherical form of the firmament as the result of our using both eyes, which use from habit has become the form of monocular vision also, and not as Wundt does from the spherical form of each visual field, which by habit has been transferred to binocular vision. There is a strange fact that distances on the left side are overestimated in comparison with those on the right side; and this fact is also claimed by Professor Lipps to be incompatible with Professor Wundt's theory, but in favor of his own views.

Th. Wertheim has made an observation which tends to prove that positive as well as negative fluctuations of light-intensity, cause the disappearance of objects indirectly seen.

G. Sergi publishes the results of his investigations concerning the sense of touch made in the Institute for Anthropology and Experimental Psychology at the University of Rome.

Karl L. Schaefer's results of experiments with invertebrate animals upon the rotatory table show that in the beginning a counter-rotation takes place, but not in all animals. It does not take place in some caterpillars; it does take place in black beetles, ants, flies, earwigs, provided they are at the time in actual motion. There is no after-affect from the rotation and thus they are not subject to vertigo as are the vertebrates. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.) κρς.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Vol. XVI. No. 2.

BEITRÄGE ZUR LOGIK. (Zweiter Artikel. Schluss.) By *A. Riehl*.

ERNST PLATNER'S WISSENSCHAFTLICHE STELLUNG ZU KANT IN ERKENNTNISS-
THEORIE UND MORALPHILOSOPHIE. (Zweiter Artikel. Schluss.) By *B. Selig-*
kowitz.

ÜBER BEGRIFF UND GEGENSTAND. By *G. Frege*.

BEMERKUNGEN ZU RICHARD AVENARIUS'S "KRITIK DER REINEN ERFAHRUNG."
By *R. Willy*.

A. Riehl discusses in the second instalment of his "Contributions to Logic" the forms of judgment and the different kinds of conclusion. B. Seligkowitz concludes his article on Ernst Platner's relation to Kant, setting forth the former's criticism of the latter's views of synthetic judgments *a priori*, his moral theology, his psychological ideas, and moral philosophy. G. Frege explains his view of 'concept and object' with reference to the idea of Benno Kerry, who does not recognise between the two any absolute difference. (Leipsic: Reisland) κρς.